- Safiu Kehinde
The Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project group (SERAP) has called on the Federal Government to withdraw the 2019 Lawful Interception of Communications Regulations, labelling it as unconstitutional, unlawful and entirely inconsistent with Nigeria’s international obligations.
SERAP Charged President Bola Tinubu to direct Bosun Tijani, the Minister of Communications, Innovation and Digital Economy to immediately withdraw the regulations.
The request followed allegations by the former Kaduna State Governor, Nasir El-Rufai that the National Security Adviser (NSA), Nuhu Ribadu’s phone conversation was intercepted.
NPO Reported that El-Rufai had in an interview on Arise TV’s Prime Time programme earlier this month defended his allegation of Ribadu calling for his arrest by admitting tapping into the NSA’s phone conversation.
“The NSA’s call was tapped. They do that to our calls too, and we heard him saying they should arrest me.” He said.
SERAP, in a letter dated 21 February 2026 and signed by its Deputy Director, Kolawole Oluwadare, urged Tinubu to urgently initiate a transparent and inclusive legislative process to ensure that any lawful interception framework fully complies with constitutional safeguards, judicial oversight requirements, and Nigeria’s international obligations.
The organisation held that the regulations establish a sweeping mass surveillance regime that violates Nigerians’ constitutionally and internationally guaranteed human rights including to privacy and freedom of expression.
It added that the regulations grant overly broad and vague powers to intercept communications on grounds such as ‘national security,’ ‘economic wellbeing,’ and ‘public emergency,’ without adequate judicial safeguards, independent oversight, transparency, or effective remedies.
This serious interferences with fundamental rights, according to SERAP, cannot be authorised through subsidiary regulations or exercised in secrecy without strict safeguards.”
The letter, read in part: “The Regulations also raise serious concerns as Nigeria approaches the 2027 general elections. Broad and weakly safeguarded interception powers create a real risk of abuse during politically sensitive periods.”
“Surveillance measures that lack strict necessity, proportionality and independent judicial oversight can easily be weaponised against political opponents, journalists, civil society actors and election observers.
“In an electoral climate, even the perception that private communications are being monitored can chill political organising, investigative reporting and voter mobilisation.
“Free and fair elections depend on confidential communications, protected journalistic sources and open democratic debate. Any misuse of intercepted data for intimidation, political advantage or disinformation would fundamentally undermine Nigerians’ right to political participation and electoral integrity.
“As 2027 approaches, interception powers must be narrowly defined, subject to prior independent judicial authorisation and backed by effective remedies. Without robust safeguards, these Regulations risk threatening privacy rights, freedom of expression and the credibility of Nigeria’s democratic process.
“Any restriction on the right to privacy must strictly comply with the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality. The Regulations fail all three tests.
“The Regulations normalise surveillance as routine state practice and invert the presumption of privacy by criminalising interception except as permitted under the Regulations.
“We would be grateful if the recommended measures are taken within 7 days of the receipt and/or publication of this letter. If we have not heard from you by then, SERAP shall take all appropriate legal actions to compel your government to comply with our request in the public interest.
“The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has made it unequivocally clear: mass surveillance programmes based on indiscriminate and blanket collection of personal data are arbitrary per se and can never satisfy the requirements of legality, necessity, and proportionality.
“The mere retention or storage of personal data relating to an individual’s private life constitutes an interference with this right—whether or not the data is subsequently accessed or used.
“Secret surveillance and bulk data collection create a permanent risk of misuse, profiling and abuse, particularly given the formidable technologies available to state authorities.
“Your government has a positive obligation to adopt clear laws, effective safeguards, independent oversight mechanisms and accessible remedies to prevent abuse. These duties extend not only to state agencies but also to private actors, including telecommunications providers and technology companies.
“The Nigerian Communications Commission (the Commission) while purportedly exercising its powers under section 70 of the Nigerian Communications Act, 2003 adopted the ‘Lawful Interception of Communications Regulations, 2019 (The Regulations).
“Under Regulation 4, broad discretionary interception powers are granted to the National Security Adviser and the State Security Services, with minimal clarity regarding the scope or limits of such discretion.
“The provision also extends to communications within and outside Nigeria and grants blanket immunity to licensees acting ‘in good faith.’ Such broad and vaguely defined powers create significant risks of abuse, including political misuse.
“The inconsistencies in the Regulations create serious legal concerns. Regulation 4(1) limits interception powers to the National Security Adviser (NSA) and the State Security Services (SSS), and Regulation 12(1) reiterates this restriction.
“However, Regulation 23 on ‘Interpretation’ expands the category of ‘authorised agencies’ to include additional bodies such as the Nigeria Police Force, National Intelligence Agency, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, and any other agency the Commission may designate.
“This creates ambiguity and undermines legal certainty. Nigerians cannot reasonably know which authorities are empowered to intercept their communications, making the Regulations unpredictable and prone to arbitrary application and abuse.
“By delegating authority to the Commission to expand the list at its discretion, Regulation 23 effectively grants unfettered administrative power, contrary to constitutional guarantees of privacy under Section 37 of the Nigerian Constitution and Nigeria’s binding international human rights obligations.
“Such regulatory ambiguity threatens the rule of law, weakens accountability mechanisms, and increases the risk of abuse, particularly in politically sensitive contexts or during elections. Clear, narrowly defined statutory limits are essential wherever state authorities are empowered to intrude upon private communications.”
“Regulation 8 is particularly troubling, as it permits interception without a warrant in situations involving consent, threats to life, or actions in the ‘ordinary course of business.’ These grounds are overly broad and clearly susceptible to abuse.
“Even where warrants are required, applications are made ex parte and without adversarial safeguards. Grounds such as ‘national security’ and ‘economic wellbeing’ are insufficiently defined, undermining the principles of legality and foreseeability.
“The Regulations also fail to require notification of individuals who have been subjected to surveillance, either during or after interception. Without notification, the ability of individuals to challenge unlawful surveillance is severely undermined.
“Private communications form part of individuals’ intimate sphere and personal development. In the digital age, protecting these rights requires exceptional vigilance.
“The Regulations supposedly establish under Regulation 2 a ‘legal and regulatory framework for the lawful interception of communications in Nigeria.
“Under Regulation 6, intercepted communications may be retained for the duration of an investigation and archived for up to three years. There is no clarity on conditions governing storage, destruction, and oversight of retained data.
“Regulation 9 compels disclosure of encryption keys and access mechanisms by licensees and private persons. This provision weakens cybersecurity for everyone and fails to provide safeguards for journalists, lawyers, and human rights defenders whose communications require heightened protection.
“Regulations 10 and 11 require licensees to install interception equipment and prohibit services without interception capacity. These provisions effectively discourage privacy-enhancing technologies and undermine secure communications, thereby chilling freedom of privacy, expression and association.
“Emergency interception powers under Regulation 12 allow warrantless surveillance on broad grounds, including ‘national security’ and ‘organised crime’, without prior judicial authorisation. Vague national security grounds violate the right to privacy.
“Regulations 13 to 15 grant extensive powers of entry, seizure, and execution without establishing an independent review mechanism. Likewise, Regulation 19 limits reporting to the Attorney General of the Federation, a political appointee, without independent parliamentary or judicial oversight.
“SERAP believes that where powers affecting fundamental rights are exercised in secrecy and concentrated in political authorities without independent supervision, the risks of arbitrariness are substantial.
“Any interference with privacy must be ‘provided by law’ in a formal and material sense — meaning the law must be precise, democratically enacted, accessible and predictable. Serious limitations on constitutional rights should not be introduced through subsidiary regulations lacking parliamentary scrutiny.
“While SERAP acknowledges the government’s responsibility to address national security and organised crime, such objectives must be pursued within constitutional and international human rights limits. The Regulations are neither necessary in a democratic society nor proportionate.”